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taste	 are	 relativism	 and	 contextualism.	Although	 these	 views	make	
similar	predictions	in	many	cases,	they	crucially	come	apart	when	it	
comes	to	the	indicated	types	of	situations.	Relativism	predicts	that	the	






berg,	 2007;	 Stojanovic,	 2007;	 López	 de	 Sa,	 2008;	Moltmann,	 2010;	






sertion	 that	 something	was	 tasty,	 if	 the	flavor	 the	 thing	




and	 suggests	 that	 “our	 intuitions	 are	 sufficiently	 divergent,	 and/or	
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Part I: Gathering the data
2. Relativism and Contextualism 
In	this	section,	we’ll	explain	relativism	and	contextualism	and	where	









tasty	 isn’t	 just	expressed	by	 the	 sentences	 in	question,	according	 to	




sentence	 as	 the	 proposition	 the sentence asserts.	 Relativists	 are	 thus	
committed	to	the	following	principle:
R1.	The	proposition	asserted	by	 ‘F	 is/isn’t	 tasty’	 in	a	giv-
en	context	κ	(invariably)	is	the	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	
tasty.
Relativists	 hold	 further	 that	 this	 invariably	 asserted	 proposition	
has	truth-values	only	relative	to	what	we’ll	call	a	taste standard.	More	
specifically,	they	propose	to	add	a	taste	standard	to	the	circumstance	






context-sensitivity	 in	 the	 term	replacing	 “F”.	This	 should	be	unproblematic	
because	all	our	example	cases	hold	respective	context	factors	fixed.	























and	 a	 contextualist	 reading	 and	 that	 people	 respond	 differently	 de-
pending	on	which	reading	they	happen	to	select.	We	then	address	the	
indicated	direction	effect	(§7).	The	suggestion	here	will	be	that	people	
are	more	 inclined	to	 favor	 the	relativist	 reading	when	they	start	out	
disliking	 the	 food	 in	question	due	 to	 an	 independent	preference	 to	
interpret	speakers	negatively.	We	address	some	alternative	candidate	
accounts	of	the	data	(§8)	before	we	conclude	(§9).
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truth	norm.	Again,	the	truth	norm	can	be	spelled	out	in	different	ways.	

















































of	 the	 type	 above	make	 predictions	 about	 our	 ordinary	 use	 of	 lan-
guage	by	way	of	the	norms	governing	speech	acts.	There	are	different	
types	of	speech	acts	one	might	consider	here.	We’ll	focus	on	assertions	
in	 this	paper.	With	respect	 to	assertions,	 there	are	different	 types	of	
norms	one	might	 invoke.	The	most	prominent	 candidates	 are	 truth,	
justification,	and	knowledge	norms.	For	concreteness,	we’ll	assume	a	
3.	 Some	 relativists	add	a	 taste	 standard	 to	 the	circumstance	of	evaluation,	as	
we	do,	while	others	add	a	 judge.	We	 focus	on	 the	 former	version	because	
we	think	it’s	better	equipped	to	make	sense	of	the	data	we’ll	report	below.	In	

























Suppose,	 for	 instance,	 that	 you	 assertively	utter	 ‘Licorice	 is	 tasty’	 at	
t*.	According	 to	C1,	 you	will	 thereby	 assert	 that	 licorice	 is	 tasty	 by	






in	 a	 contextualist	 framework	where	 the	 circumstance	 of	 evaluation	





















form	 ‘F	 is/isn’t	 tasty’	 express	 different	 propositions	 at	 different	 con-
texts	of	use.	We	can	generically	refer	to	the	proposition	expressed	in	
a	given	context	κ	as	the	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	tasty	by the lights of 
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depends	solely	on	 this	earlier	 taste	standard.	Her	present	 taste	stan-
dard	at	κ2	doesn’t	matter.
Generalizing	a	bit,	we	arrive	at	competing	verdicts	for	the	follow-






Σ2.	 In	 κ1,	 F	 isn’t	 tasty	 by	 the	 lights	 of	 S’s	 taste	 standard.	
























simply	be	 the	proposition	 that what Hannah said was true.	 The	ques-
tion	now	is	whether	this	proposition	is	true	relative	to	<t2,s2>.	Given	
REF,	 ‘what	Hannah	said’	 refers	 to	 the	proposition	she	previously	as-
serted.	According	to	relativism,	and	R1	in	particular,	 the	proposition	
Hannah	previously	asserted	is	the	proposition	that fish sticks are tasty.	
The	proposition	that what Hannah asserted was true	should	thus	be	true	
relative	to	<t2,s2>	iff	the	proposition	that the proposition that fish sticks 
are tasty was true	is	true	relative	to	<t2,s2>.	By	T2,	this	condition	holds	iff,	







of	assertion	C3,	Hannah’s	assertion	 in	κ2	will	be	permitted	 iff	 the	as-
serted	proposition	is	true	relative	to	the	circumstance	<t2>	determined	
by	κ2.	Given	the	principle	T1,	the	asserted	proposition	will	again	be	the	
proposition	that what Hannah said was true.	Given	REF	and	the	contex-
tualist	assumption	C1,	‘what	she	said’	refers	to	the	proposition	that fish 
sticks are tasty by the lights of the taste standard s1 determined by κ1.	Thus,	
the	proposition	that what Hannah said was true	should	be	true	relative	
to	<t2>	iff	the	proposition	that the proposition that fish sticks are tasty by 
the lights of s1 was true	is	true	relative	to	<t2>.	According	to	T2,	this	con-
dition	holds	 iff,	 for	 some	 time	 t1	prior	 to	 t2,	 the	proposition	 that fish 
sticks are tasty by the lights of s1	is	true	relative	to	<t1>.	According	to	C2,	
this	condition	in	turn	is	met	iff,	at	t1,	fish	sticks	are	tasty	by	the	lights	of	
s1.	C-SIMP	now	has	it	that	s1	simply	is	the	taste	standard	Hannah	has	
at	 the	context	κ1.	This	means	 that	 the	permissibility	of	her	assertion	
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In	light	of	this	worry,	we	want	to	suggest	a	different	strategy	to	test	
the	 indicated	verdicts,	 if	only	 for	 the	purposes	of	methodological	di-
versity.	The	basic	idea	will	be	to	look	at	what	people	judge	they	would 
say	in	a	given	context	rather	than	what	they	judge	is permissible to say.	














































here,	 we	 could	 directly	 test	 whether	 people’s	 “permissibility”	 judg-
ments	are	 in	 line	with	 the	 indicated	verdicts.	This	 could	confirm	or	
disconfirm	these	verdicts	if	ordinary	speakers	generally	know	under	
which	conditions	an	assertion	is	permissible.
We	 aren’t	 entirely	 opposed	 to	 this	 approach.	 Knobe	 and	 Yalcin	














	 alexander	dinges	&	julia	zakkou A Direction Effect on Taste Predicates
philosophers’	imprint	 –		8		–	 vol.	20,	no.	27	(september	2020)
4.1 Experiment 1
Participants	 were	 presented	 with	 one	 of	 two	 vignettes.	 In	 each	 vi-










Picture yourself in the following scenario.








“That’s	 funny,	 I	 have	 a	 clear	 recollection	 of	 you	 saying	
‘Yumble	isn’t	tasty’	last	time	we	met!”
After	 reading	 this	 vignette,	 participants	 received	 instructions	 to	 rate	
how	likely	they	would	be	to	judge	what	they	said	before	as	true,	and	
how	likely	they	would	be	to	judge	it	as	false.	Answers	could	be	given	










People	 will	 judge	 that:	 if	 they	 found	 themselves	 in	 κ2, 
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“Yumble	is	tasty.”




“That’s	 funny,	 I	 have	 a	 clear	 recollection	 of	 you	 saying	
‘Yumble	is	tasty’	last	time	we	met!”













tasty”	and	 “What	 I	 said	was	 true.	Still,	Yumble	 is	 tasty.”	We	 inserted	
“still”	in	the	second	response	because	we	felt	that	there	was	a	contrast	
between	 the	 first	 and	 the	 second	 sentence	 even	 on	 a	 contextualist	
view,	and	we	didn’t	want	to	downgrade	the	response	by	leaving	this	
contrast	unarticulated.12
The	 second	 condition	 (“LtoNL”	 for	 liking	 to	 not	 liking)	 differed	
from	 the	 first	 in	 that	 participants	 started	 out	 liking	 rather	 than	 dis-
liking	Yumble	and	ended	up	disliking	rather	than	liking	it.	It	read	as	
follows:
Picture yourself in the following scenario.
Yumble	 is	 a	 new	brand	 of	 bubblegum.	You	 have	 never	









prefer	 the	 “true”	 to	 the	 “false”	 response	 or vice versa.	 Even	 if	 our	 “true”	 re-
sponse	fails	to	live	up	to	the	indicated	ideal,	 it	should	still	be	preferable	to	
the	“false”	response	according	to	contextualism.	After	all,	even	as	stated,	the	




























ences	are	more	or	 less	equally	 likely	 to	go	one	way	 rather	 than	 the	
other.	Call	this	result	the	even split.	Second,	which	preference	people	
have	is	affected	by	the	direction	in	which	they	change	their	taste	stan-













The	 data	 were	 analyzed	 using	 a	 mixed-model	 repeated	 measures	
ANOVA,	with	condition	(NLtoL	vs.	LtoNL)	as	a	between-subject	vari-







two	 statements	within	 each	 condition.	 In	 the	NLtoL	 condition,	 par-
ticipants	gave	higher	ratings	for	the	“false”	statement	(M	=	54.28,	SD 












To	 further	 explore	 the	 interaction,	 we	 compared	 judgments	 for	













251	 participants	 were	 recruited	 through	 Amazon	 Mechanical	 Turk	
(49%	 female,	mean	 age	 36).	 As	 before,	 participants	 were	 randomly	
assigned	to	either	of	two	conditions.	The	conditions	were	exact	cop-
ies	of	the	above	NLtoL	and	LtoNL	conditions	except	that	we	replaced	
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4.3.1 Method












statement	 (M	=	45.58,	SD	=	36.12)	 than	 for	 the	 “false”	 statement	 (M 
=	42.69,	SD	=	36.07),	but	as	before,	this	difference	wasn’t	statistically	
significant,	t(129)	=	.48,	p	=	.632.
Again,	 the	average	absolute	difference	between	 responses	 to	 the	






out	 disliking	Yumble,	 but	 there	was	 no	 clear	 preference	 either	way	
in	 the	 other	 condition.	 These	 results	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 negation	















	 alexander	dinges	&	julia	zakkou A Direction Effect on Taste Predicates
philosophers’	imprint	 –		13		– vol.	20,	no.	27	(september	2020)















a	 contextualist	 reading.	They	 can	be	used	 to	 assert	 either	 that	 F	 is/
isn’t	 tasty	 (relativist	 reading)	 or	 that	 F	 is/isn’t	 tasty	 by	 the	 lights	 of	
the	taste	standard	determined	by	the	context	of	utterance	(contextu-
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ly)	 saying	 that	 licorice	 is	 tasty	 to her in	 her	first	 utterance.	 It	makes	
perfect	sense	then	for	her	to	point	this	out	later	on.	In	δ2,	“Licorice	is	
tasty”	is	read	in	terms	of	relativism.	Thus,	Ann	and	Ben	are	expressing	
contradicting	propositions	(that	 licorice	 is	 tasty	vs.	 that	 licorice	 isn’t	
tasty),	and	it	makes	sense	for	Ann	to	insist	on	that.16
15.	 See	e.g.	Lasersohn	(2005);	Stephenson	(2007);	and	MacFarlane	(2014:	155–
156)	 for	 further	discussion	of	 the	 relevant	phenomena	 in	 relativist-friendly	
terms.











H2a	 (=	R2).	 The	proposition	 that	 F	 is/isn’t	 tasty	 is	 true	
relative	to	<t,s>	iff,	at	t,	F	is/isn’t	tasty	by	the	lights	of	s.









Note	 that	 even	 though	we’ll	 stick	with	 simple	 hybrid	 relativism	 for	
the	 purposes	 of	 this	 paper,	we	 are	 not	 committed	 to	 simplicity.	We	
think	that	H-SIMP	makes	correct	predictions	 for	 the	contexts	 in	 the	
specific	conditions	we	consider	(NLtoL	and	LtoNL).	But	there	might	
be	 other	 contexts	 that	 force	 us	 to	make	 the	 view	more	 flexible.	 So-
called	“exocentric”	contexts	(Lasersohn,	2005),	for	instance,	might	be	
contextualist	 readings	play	 an	 important	 role	 even	 in	 autocentric	 contexts,	
and	in	particular,	in	the	kinds	of	contexts	described	in	our	vignettes.
















To	 see	 the	 plausibility	 of	 NEG,	 suppose	 you	 are	 confronted	with	 a	




















simple	hybrid	 relativism,	 the	utterance	of	 ‘Yumble	 isn’t	 tasty’	 in	 the	
initial	context	can	receive	either	a	simple	relativist	or	a	simple	contex-
tualist	 reading.	 Suppose	 a	participant	 chooses	 the	 relativist	 reading.	












used	to	explain	the	direction	effect,	 that	 is,	 the	result	 that	 there	 is	a	
slightly	 stronger	preference	 for	 “false”	 in	NLtoL	 than	 in	LtoNL.	The	
basic	 idea	will	be	 that	 there	 is	a	slightly	stronger	preference	 for	 the	
relativist	reading	in	this	condition.	The	following	sections	outline	how	
this	strengthened	preference	for	the	relativist	reading	comes	about.
7. The Direction Effect
Our	 account	 of	 the	 direction	 effect	 has	 two	 ingredients	 in	 addition	









and	 retraction	data.	We	cannot	enter	 this	debate	here,	but	 see	e.g.	Dinges	
(2017)	and	Beddor	and	Egan	(2018)	for	recent	relativist-friendly	discussion.








This	view	has	 the	 important	consequence	 that	we	can	accommo-
date	a	 relativistic	assertion	only	 if	our	 taste	standards	agree	with	re-
spect	 to	 the	 food	 in	question.	Suppose,	 for	 instance,	 that	you	assert	
that	fish	sticks	are	tasty.	On	the	given	view,	this	assertion	is	a	proposal	




in	 the	 conversation.	 For	 otherwise,	 people	 end	 up	 believing	 things	
that	 aren’t	 true	 from	 their	perspective	 (we	are	 assuming	a	 reflexive	
belief	norm	analogous	to	the	assertion	norm	H3	above;	see	e.g.	Kölbel,	
2003:	70).
7.3 Accounting for the direction effect





































featuring	 negated	 positive	 vs.	 negated	 negative	 adjectives.	 Ruytenbeek	 et	











19.	 The	 Stalnakerian	 account	 of	 assertion	 is	 consistent	 with	 our	 previous	 as-
sumption	of	norms	of	assertion.	In	fact,	it	might	even	support	these	norms	
(see	e.g.	MacFarlane,	2011:	89).	Notice	that	while	we’re	assuming	that	certain	













ism,	according	 to	which	 the	 taste	standard	determined	by	a	context	
isn’t	univocally	tied	to	the	current	taste	standard	of	the	speaker	of	the	
context	(e.g.	Stojanovic,	2007;	Schaffer,	2011;	Dowell,	2011).	Schaffer	
(2011:	 191–192),	 for	 instance,	 suggests	 that	 stereotypical	 contexts	 ei-
ther	determine	this	individual	taste	standard	or	else	the	taste	standard	
of	“the	typical	person”.	Thus,	a	sentence	like	‘Yumble	is	tasty’	has	an	
individualistic	 reading,	 where	 it	 roughly	 expresses	 that	 the	 speaker	









Lasersohn,	2005:	652	and	MacFarlane,	 2014:	 12	 for	 related	 consider-
ations).	By	a	principle	of	charity,	participants	should	favor	the	perfectly	
justified	individualistic	 interpretation.	This,	 in	turn,	should	lead	to	a	
























that	 the	 account	 is	 independently	motivated	 and	plausible.	We	 still	
grant	that	further	work	will	need	to	be	done.	The	motivation	for	NEG, 
for	instance,	remains	at	an	intuitive	level	and	the	ambiguity	posited	by	
hybrid	 relativism	may	give	rise	 to	 independent	predictions	 that	will	
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contextualist	 reading,	 for	 the	 speaker	 knows	 that	 she	 likes/dislikes	





ple	 contextualism	 and	 add	 a	 pragmatic	 overlay	 instead.	Contextual-




(Sundell,	 2011;	 Plunkett	 and	 Sundell,	 2013)	 and	 suggest	 that	 “tasty”	








et	 al.	 (2009a)	 and	 Larson	 et	 al.	 (2009b),	 for	 instance,	 provide	 evi-
dence	that	many	pragmatically	conveyed	contents	only	mildly	affect	
truth-value	assessments	of	the	relevant	kind.	Second,	even	if	we	grant	
the	suggested	account	of	 the	even	split,	 it	 is	unclear	how	pragmatic	
contextualism	could	be	developed	further	to	make	sense	of	the	direc-
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discussion”	fixes	which	 taste	standard	 is	 relevant	 in	a	given	context.	
But	 there	 seem	 to	 be	 no	 relevant	 differences	 between	 NLtoL	 and	
LtoNL	when	 it	comes	 to	 the	question	under	discussion	at	 the	point	
where	participants	are	asked	to	assess	their	previous	taste	claims.


















one	 strategy	 to	 accommodate	 the	 data,	 namely,	 an	 account	 that	 ap-
peals	to	hybrid	relativism.	On	this	view,	people	have	no	clear	prefer-
ence	regarding	the	truth-value	of	previous	taste	claims,	because	these	








relativism	 haven’t	 been	 suggested	 in	 the	 literature.	 The	 reason	 pre-
sumably	is	that	these	amendments	on	behalf	of	contextualism	are	usu-






This	could	explain	 the	even	split	as	 follows.	 In	 the	 initial	conver-











ing	 challenge,	 though,	 is	 to	make	 sense	of	 the	direction	 effect.	 The	
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